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Why does the level of economic activity vary so much across space? One reason
given is “agglomeration economies,” meaning that a ﬁrm’s or household’s production
costs (of market and home goods, respectively) are lower when production is car-
ried out in close proximity to other ﬁrms and households. In this paper I explore,
via a quantitative spatial macroeconomic model, the contribution of agglomeration
economies to the observed spatial concentration of US employment. The approach
is analogous to “business-cycle accounting” or “growth accounting.” The results of
the “spatial accounting” performed in this study depend on the details of the model
used. The critical detail pertains to how the model rationalizes the stability of low-
density localities. If it is rationalized via an appeal to restrictions on labor mobility,
the accounting implies that the bulk of spatial concentration results from an unequal
distribution of natural advantages. In contrast, if it is rationalized via an agglom-
eration threshold (an employment level below which local increasing returns do not
operate), the accounting implies that the bulk of the spatial concentration results from
increasing returns.
1I. Introduction
The bulk of the economic activity of an industrially developed country takes place in densely
settled areas that make up a small portion of a country’s overall territory. This striking spatial
concentration is thought to result from two distinct sources. The ﬁrst source is the need to extract
and/or use a natural resource. The second source is the cost advantages conferred by spatial
concentration itself, i.e., agglomeration economies or increasing returns.
If both fundamentals and increasing returns are relevant for the location of economic activity,
how much of the observed spatial concentration of a country can be attributed to each of these
two sources? In this paper, I answer this question using an approach that is novel in this context
but common in quantitative macroeconomics. I start by developing a general equilibrium model
with heterogeneous localities and local increasing returns. The model describes the determination
of employment in each of many locations, locations that taken together exhaust the physical space
available for economic activity. I restrict the model’s parameters to match evidence on the likely
magnitude of net agglomeration beneﬁts (local increasing returns net of congestion costs) and the
observed spatial distribution of U.S. employment for a recent year (1999). I then use the restricted
model to determine how employment for that year would be distributed if agglomeration economies
are counterfactually suppressed. A comparison of the counterfactual employment distribution with
the actual one provides one indication of the inﬂuence agglomeration economies on the spatial
distribution of employment.
The research reported in this paper complements the few existing studies that attempt to
gauge the relative importance of natural advantages versus increasing returns. Kim (1995, 1999)
uses a model of comparative advantage with immobile factors to calculate an upper bound on
the contribution of agglomeration economies to regional variation in economic activity. Ellison
and Glaeser (1997a) examine how their measures of industry concentration (introduced in Ellison
and Glaeser (1999)) decline when account is taken of the availability of a limited set of natural
resources. Rappaport and Sachs (2002) seek to identify the contribution of access to water (to
a coast, navigable river or lake) for the spatial variation in employment. These studies conclude
that natural advantages seem to play a major role in accounting for spatial variation in economic
activity.1
1Relatedly, Hanson (2002) has looked for conﬁrmation, in US data, of the “home market eﬀect” predicted by
Krugman’s (1991) model of geographic concentration. Davis and Weinstein (2002a, b) have looked for evidence of
1A common feature of these studies is that each attempts to determine the relative importance of
natural advantages by conditioning spatial variation in the variable of interest (economic activity,
employment, or measures of concentration) on proxies for speciﬁc natural resources. At least in the
Kim and Ellison and Glaeser papers, the residual variation is viewed as an upper bound estimate of
the impact of increasing returns. In contrast, the approach in this paper is to start with estimates
of agglomeration economies (surveyed in Moomaw (1981) and more recently in Rosenthal and
Strange (2003)) and determine, with the aid of a general equilibrium model, how much of the
spatial variation in employment can plausibly be explained on the basis of these estimates. This
approach has the advantage in that it’s easier to establish a plausible range of variation for the
degree of local increasing returns than it is to measure the (essentially limitless) variation in natural
resources.
The investigation is disciplined by requiring that the model on which the counterfactual is
performed account for the actual spatial distribution of employment. Both agglomeration economies
and natural advantage are centripetal forces (to use terms popularized by Fujita, Krugman, and
Venables (1999)) that work to concentrate economic activity into a relatively small number of
locations. These centripetal forces are opposed by a set of centrifugal forces that work to disperse
employment. The main centrifugal force in the model is the cost imposed by congestion. Congestion
costs work to push employment away from dense areas toward less dense ones. For any given
magnitudes of agglomeration economies and congestion costs, the requirement that the model
account for the actual distribution of employment imputes a value to the strength of each locality’s
natural advantage. Thus, the empirical strategy is to treat natural advantage as a residual. When
agglomeration economies are counterfactually suppressed, the imputed spatial pattern of natural
advantage become the counterweight to the centrifugal force of congestion costs. In this paper,
natural advantage should be interpreted to include the eﬀects of local regulations on the production
and consumption of goods.
The key challenge in implementing this approach stems from the fact that for plausible mag-
nitudes of agglomeration economies and congestion costs, the model predicts that low-density lo-
calities are unstable and should either agglomerate up and become more dense or lose all their
residents. Put diﬀerently, the model cannot account for the large numbers of low-density localities
multiple equilibria (predicted, again, by the Krugman model but implied more generally by agglomeration economies)
in postwar Japan.
2observed in reality as a stable equilibrium outcome. Instability of small localities is a well-known
theme in urban economics, and this theme is present in this study as well.
I experiment with two ways of restoring the stability, or viability, of low-density localities. In
the ﬁrst alternative, a second centrifugal force is introduced in the guise of individuals who can only
reside in particular places. This feature is reminiscent of the distribution of farmers in Krugman’s
(1991) model of economic geography, people who are modeled as being tied to a particular region
and who do not make a location decision. It is also the feature invoked by Ciccone and Hall (1996)
to make sense of their ﬁnding that the net beneﬁts from agglomeration are positive. With positive
net beneﬁts to agglomeration, all economic activity should get concentrated in one giant location.
Ciccone and Hall appeal to people’s devotion to particular places as the force that prevents this
extreme concentration from materializing.
The second alternative is to weaken the force of increasing returns for low-density localities. In
this alternative, local employment is required to attain a certain minimum level for agglomeration
economies to manifest themselves. Instability of low-density equilibrium results from the positive
feedback induced by local increasing returns. By suppressing the positive feedback, an agglom-
eration threshold restores stability of low-density localities. Consequently, with an agglomeration
threshold in place, less restriction on labor mobility is needed to account for low-density localities.
Indeed, if the agglomeration threshold is chosen suﬃciently high, no restriction on labor mobility
is needed at all.
If the ﬁrst alternative is chosen, the model reproduces the actual distribution of employment
by imputing to each locality the strength of its natural advantage and whether existing residents of
the locality are free to relocate. When agglomeration economies are counterfactually suppressed,
these imputations of natural advantage and restrictions on labor mobility determine the new equi-
librium distribution of employment. The new distribution of employment is unambiguously less
concentrated than the actual distribution, a result that holds for every counterfactual performed
in this study. However, in this case the quantitative magnitude of the deconcentration turns out to
be somewhat modest. When agglomeration economies are suppressed, the model predicts that the
spatial concentration of employment, as measured by the Gini concentration index, will be 24 per-
cent less than the actual spatial concentration of employment. Furthermore, for plausible variation
in the magnitude of agglomeration economies and congestion costs, the predicted decline in spatial
concentration does not exceed 35 percent. Thus, a basic message from this set of counterfactuals
3is that agglomeration economies are an important factor in spatial concentration but not the most
important factor. The bulk of the spatial concentration appears to be due to spatial inequality in
fundamentals.
If the second alternative is chosen, the model again reproduces the actual distribution of em-
ployment by imputing to each location the strength of its natural advantage and whether residents
of the location are free to relocate. However, because the agglomeration threshold is an alternative
way of restoring stability to low-density localities, the imputed restrictions on labor mobility are now
generally much less severe. It turns out that this alternative implies a much larger contribution
agglomeration economies. For a modest value of the threshold parameter, the baseline calibra-
tion predicts that if agglomeration economies are suppressed, spatial concentration will decline 63
percent. Furthermore, for plausible variation in the magnitude of agglomeration economies and
congestion costs, the predicted decline in spatial concentration stays above 50 percent. For this
set of experiments, then, agglomeration economies turn out to be a major factor in the spatial
concentration of employment.
Since neither empirical nor theoretical literatures on agglomeration economies address the pos-
sibility of an agglomeration threshold, it’s unclear which of the two sets of quantitative results is
closer to the truth. However, the fact that the results depend on the presence or absence of an
agglomeration threshold is in itself an important ﬁnding. Basically, it appears that to gauge the
contribution of local increasing returns to spatial concentration, it’s important to understand why
low-density localities are a stable outcome of spatial equilibrium. If low-density localities survive
because some people have a strong desire to live in these places, the contribution of agglomeration
economies to spatial concentration may well be quite low. On the other hand, if low-density locali-
ties survive because the positive feedback from increasing returns is absent (or very weak) for these
localities, the contribution of increasing returns to spatial concentration could well be much larger.
Since an agglomeration threshold limits the scope of increasing returns, it isn’t obvious why
it should imply a larger contribution of increasing returns. Brieﬂy, the reason for this result is
as follows. If there is no agglomeration threshold, currently large (and dense) localities beneﬁt
more from local increasing returns compared to currently small (and sparse) localities. Because
the model is required to account for the current distribution of employment, it counterbalances
the beneﬁt of size by imputing relatively poor fundamentals (natural advantage) to currently dense
localities. When agglomeration economies are suppressed, there is a tendency for employment to
4reconcentrate around currently sparse localities because these localities have low congestion costs
and relatively superior fundamentals. This tendency for concentration to re-emerge prevents the
Gini index from declining steeply. In contrast, size confers less of an advantage when there is
an agglomeration threshold and the model imputes relatively superior fundamentals to currently
dense localities. In this case, suppression of agglomeration economies does not imply a tendency
for employment to re-concentrate in currently sparse localities. Instead, absence of agglomeration
economies leads to a more dispersed spatial distribution of employment and, consequently, a steeper
decline in the Gini concentration index.
In accounting for the current spatial distribution of employment, the model also determines if
the residents of each locality are free to relocate. These imputed restrictions on labor mobility also
inﬂuence the results. When there is no agglomeration threshold, these restrictions become a barrier
against the tendency of employment to re-concentrate; when there is an agglomeration threshold,
the restrictions become a barrier against the tendency of employment to de-concentrate. In other
words, the imputed restrictions on labor mobility prevent the spatial inequality in fundamentals
to fully exert their inﬂuence. When the imputed spatial pattern of fundamentals is conducive to
spatial concentration (as it is when there is no agglomeration threshold), the inability of people to
move is a force against spatial concentration; when the imputed pattern is conducive to a dispersed
distribution of employment (as it is when there is an agglomeration threshold), the inability of
people to move is a force in favor of spatial concentration.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the model. Section 3 has a
detailed discussion of the nature of spatial equilibrium in the model. Section 4 describes how the
model is mapped to U.S. data, and section 5 presents the results of all the counterfactuals. Section
6 summarizes the ﬁndings and suggests some questions for future research.
II. The Model Economy
There are  distinct geographical areas indexed by  =1 23. These areas will be referred
to as localities. The collection of localities is assumed to exhaust the physical space available for
economic activity in the economy. Localities can diﬀer with respect to area, with respect to the
availability of natural resources, and with respect to laws and regulations that aﬀect production
and consumption possibilities. There are large number of individuals, 1 who live and work in
5these localities.2
A. Firms
There is one costlessly transportable composite good. The ﬁrm-level production function for pro-
ducing the transportable good in locality  is
 = 	
()1−, 0 1 (1)
where  and  are the capital and labor used by a plant,  is an economy-wide technology index,
and 	 is an index that captures the combined impact of locality-speciﬁc factors on production
capabilities. For instance, the production advantages conferred by being on the coast or on a
navigable river and the impact of local labor and environmental regulations will all be captured in
	
 () is a function of total employment in locality ,d e n o t e d, that takes into account the
external economies in production resulting from the scale of the locality’s labor pool. This is one








  ≥ 10 (2)
The speciﬁcation assumes that there is a threshold level , potentially 1, above which agglomera-
tion economies operate. In the range where agglomeration economies do operate the elasticity of
agglomeration beneﬁts with respect to change in local employment is a positive constant .3
Each locality can also produce a good that cannot be shipped to a diﬀerent locality. The
ﬁrm-level production function for the non-transportable good produced in locality  is
 = Γ( ),( 3 )
where  is the transportable good used as input by the ﬁrm,  is an index that captures the
combined impact of locality-speciﬁc factors on production of the non-transportable good (analogous
to 	) and Γ( ) is a function that takes into account the diseconomies imposed by local
congestion on the production of the non-transportable good. This function is taken to be
Γ( )=−() 0 (4)
2The model is adapted from Chatterjee and Carlino (2001).
3An alternative speciﬁcation of () is max{1( − )
}. In this case, the elasticity of agglomeration beneﬁt
with respect to local employment, for    is  · [( − )]. Since estimates of  do not take the possibility
of a threshold eﬀect into account, the speciﬁcation in the text was chosen over this one.
6where  is land area of locality Thus, according to (3) and (4), higher employment density in
a given locality makes the production of the non-transportable good less eﬃcient. An important
property of Γ is that the absolute value of its elasticity with respect to employment density is
increasing in employment density:
(lnΓ)
ln()
= − · () (5)
All ﬁrms behave competitively. Producers of locality ’s non-transportable good take the price
of the transportable good and employment density in locality  as given. With the price of the trans-
portable good as a numeraire, competitive production implies that price of the non-transportable
good in location  denoted , cannot exceed its marginal cost:
 ≤ −1
 () (6)
Producers of the transportable good in locality  take the level of local employment and the product
wage in that locality, , as given. They also takes  as given. Again, competitive production implies
that the price of the transportable good cannot exceed its marginal cost of production in locality :




There are two types of individuals: mobile individuals who can move between localities and immo-
bile individuals who cannot. I assume that there is a large number   1 of immobile individuals
in each locality  although  need not be large. Both types have one unit of labor which they
supply inelastically to ﬁrms producing the transportable good in their locality.
The utility of an individual living and working in locality  is given by:
 = ()1− 0 1 (8)
where  and  are the individual’s consumption of the transportable good and non-transportable
good, respectively,  is an index that captures the combined impact of locality-speciﬁca m e n i t y
factors (such as climate) and laws and regulations on utility. The function () takes into account
external beneﬁts that workers derive from the scale of the local labor pool. This is the second way








  ≥ 00 (9)
which parallels the speciﬁcation of agglomeration beneﬁts in the production of the transportable
good and has similar properties.
For tractability, I assume that mobile individuals do not have any capital income. Conditional
on the choice of locality, utility maximization implies that a mobile individual in locality  chooses
 = () and  =( 1−) Thus, the indirect utility of a mobile individual residing in locality
 is
  =[ ()(1 − )(1−)]−
  (10)
Given costless mobility, a mobile individual will choose to live and work in location  only if





The demand functions of immobile individuals who reside in locality  is similar to that of mobile
individuals except that they derive income from capital as well. That is, an immobile individual
with asset level ! who resides in locality  will choose  = ( + !) and  =( 1− )( + !)
For such an individual the indirect utility is
 (!)=[ ()(1 − )(1−)]−
 ( + !)
Since they are immobile, their indirect utility is not required to satisfy a condition like (11).
C. Equilibrium
Since there is a large number of immobile individuals in every locality, there are individuals sup-
plying labor inelastically to ﬁrms producing the transportable good in every locality. Therefore,
in any equilibrium, there must be positive production of the transportable good in every locality.
Then, it follows from (7) that






Additionally, since every locality has large number of immobile individuals with strictly positive
income (note that   0), it follows that there will be a positive demand for the non-transportable
8good in every locality for any  ∈ [0∞) Therefore, in any equilibrium, there will be positive









 by #  by $ and  by %. Then, substituting (12) and (13) into (10) and
using (2) and (9), yields:
  = "() · # · max{
+	
+	
 }·−  (14)
The r.h.s of equation (14) incorporates all the economic forces at work in this model. The ﬁrst
factor, "() captures the eﬀect on utility of economy-wide factors such as the level of
technology  a n dt h el e v e lo fi n t e r e s tr a t e s The second factor, # incorporates the eﬀect of all
local factors such as weather and amenities, availability of natural resources, and local regulations




 }, incorporates the positive eﬀect of agglomeration economies. These economies
arise both from the beneﬁts that ﬁrms receive from producing in a locality with a bigger labor
pool and the beneﬁts that people enjoy from locating close to other people. The former channel is
captured in the parameter $ (which depends, in turn, on  and ) and the latter channel in the
parameter  When  is 1,t h e s ee ﬀects operate as long as there is more than 1 person employed
in the location, but when  is greater than 1 it operates only when local employment exceeds the
threshold The ﬁnal factor, − , incorporates the negative eﬀect of congestion. As a locality
gets more dense, the price of the locally produced non-transportable good rises. For a given rise
in density, the reduction in utility is greater if the share of non-transportable good in the worker’s
budget, , is higher, if the adverse eﬀect on the production of the non-transportable good, % is
higher, and if initial density, , is higher.
An equilibrium for this economy is a number   ∗ and a vector (∗
 )
=1 that satisfy the following
conditions:
∗
 ≥  ∀  =1 23 (15)
4For instance, a mild climate or access to scenic spots would result in a higher  through a higher ,t h e
availability of a valuable natural resource such as petroleum would result in a higher  through a higher 	 and
tough labor and environmental regulations would result in a lower  through a lower 	 and 
 but a possibly higher
 through a higher 




  if ∗
   (16)




  if ∗




 =  (18)
To see this, suppose that we have   ∗ and (∗
 )
=1 that satisfy (15) - (18). Choose ∗










 ) At these wages, production of the trans-
portable good yields zero proﬁts in every locality. So, production of the transportable good in any
locality  can expand to the point where all ∗
 people are employed, i.e., at these wages the labor
market in each locality can clear. Similarly, at the prices ∗
 the production of the non-transportable
good yields zero proﬁts in every locality. So, production of the non-transportable good in any lo-
cality  can expand to the point where total demand for the non-transportable good from mobile
and immobile individuals is met, i.e., at these prices the non-transportable goods market in each
locality can clear as well.5 The only other markets in this model are those for the transportable
good and capital and by assumption both are international markets with given prices. Finally, it
is obvious that substituting ∗
 and ∗
 into (10) will yield   =   ∗ for any  with ∗
   and  
≤   ∗ for all other  Therefore, mobile individuals do not have an incentive to move to a diﬀerent
location from their current one.
III. Agglomeration Economies, Instability, and Multiple Equilibria







satisfy these conditions are economically meaningful. Because of increasing returns, an equilibrium
may be unstable with respect to small perturbations. The aim of this section is to (i) explain
how instability manifests itself in this model and how it can lead to multiple stable equilibria for a
locality and (ii) to reﬁne the deﬁnition of an equilibrium to exclude unstable equilibria.
It is convenient to work with logarithmic transforms. Let ln() be denoted by  ln()
by  ln("() · #) by &,a n dln() by '. Then, equation (14) can be written as
ln( )=& +( $ + )' +( $ + ) · max{} − % · 
In what follows, I will treat  as a continuous variable. Then, the r.h.s. of the above equation
c a nb ev i e w e da saf u n c t i o no f that is, deﬁne (():[ +∞) → ) where  ≡ ln() is the














  where  is
the average asset holdings of immobile individuals residing in locality 
10smallest employment density possible in locality  and
(()=& +( $ + )' +( $ + ) · max{} − % ·  (19)
First consider the case where     ln[($ + )%] Observe that (() is continuous over its
entire domain and diﬀerentiable everywhere except at  For  ∈ [], the implied employment
level is too low for agglomeration economies to be present. Over this range, only the congestion
eﬀect operates so that the function is strictly decreasing and strictly concave:
*(* = *2(*2 = −% ·   0 (20)
For  greater than the  the implied employment level exceeds  and agglomeration economies
are present. Over this range, the behavior of the function reﬂects the relative strengths of local
increasing returns and congestion diseconomies. For  ∈ (+∞) the ﬁrst two derivatives with
respect to  are
*(* =( $ + ) − % ·  and (21)
*2(*2 = −% ·   0 (22)
Thus, (() continues to be strictly concave but the ﬁrst derivative is positive between ( ln[($+
)%),z e r oa tln[($ + )%] and negative between (ln[($ + )%] ∞).
Figure 1 illustrates this case and shows one set of equilibrium possibilities for locality  Let (∗
be the equilibrium utility available to mobile individuals. There are three points where the (()
function intersects the horizontal “utility-at-other-locations” line, and so there are three interior
equilibrium density levels.6 However, the middle equilibrium,  has the feature that any small
exogenous increase or decrease in employment density around it raises the local utility level above
or below what mobile individuals can get in other locations. If this property is coupled with the
intuitive notion that a locality which oﬀers a higher (lower) utility than (∗ can expect to draw (lose)
mobile individuals, then a transient perturbation in density around  will move the locality to
either the  or  equilibrium. In this sense, the equilibrium  is unstable. In contrast, the 
and  equilibrium have the feature that for small enough changes in density, local utility moves in
a direction opposite to the change in density. Hence, these equilibria are stable. The instability of
the (local) equilibrium results from the positive feedback introduced by agglomeration economies.
6This assumes that the particular equilibrium attained in location  has a vanishingly small eﬀect on 
∗
11Next, consider the case where   ln[($+)%] ≤  Now, (21) implies that the (() function
is strictly decreasing over its entire domain and diverges to −∞ as  approaches +∞ If (() ( ∗,
there is a unique employment density strictly greater  for which (() is exactly equal to (∗ If
(() ≤ (∗, there can be no employment density strictly greater than  for which (() will equal
(∗ In this case, the only equilibrium is the corner equilibrium  Therefore when  ≥ ln[($+)%]
there is a unique local equilibrium for any value of (∗ and  and this equilibrium is stable.
Next, consider the case where ln[($ + )%] ≤  Then, regardless of the value of  it follows,
from (21) again, that (() function is strictly decreasing. Hence, as in the previous case, there will
be a unique stable equilibrium.
Finally, consider the case where  ≤   ln[($+)%] This can happen if  is raised (i.e., 
is raised) or  is lowered (i.e.,  is is lowered). It follows from (21) that (() is increasing right
from the start, reaches a maximum at ln($+)% and then declines. Figure 2 illustrates this case.
As u ﬃcient condition for there to be stable multiple equilibria is that (() ( ∗ ( (ln[($+)%])
When multiple stable equilibria exist, the lower stable equilibria  is always the corner equilibrium
 Even though (() is increasing at  the lower equilibrium is stable because (() ( ∗; this
gap implies that there is a small enough increase in  say + for which ((++) continues to remain
below (∗
In the rest of this paper, I will focus only on stable equilibria. To be clear, a stable equilibria
is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition : The collection {∗
(∗&  } is a stable equilibrium if it satisﬁes the follow-
ing conditions:
∗
 ≥  (23)
∗
   ⇒ (∗ = ((∗
) (24)
∗





 =  (26)
If ¯   ln[($ + )%]then
∗
   ⇒ ∗
  ∈ [¯ ln[($ + )%]] and (27)
∗
 ∈ [¯ ln[($ + )%]] ⇒ (∗ ( (∗
) (28)
Conditions (23)-(26) correspond to conditions (15)-(18). The stability requirements are incorpo-
rated in conditions (27) and (28). These conditions apply only when ¯   ln[($ + )%] i.e., the
12corresponding (() function has a rising segment. If a location has mobile workers in equilibrium,
(27) prohibits ∗
 from lying in the closed interval [¯ ln[($ + )%]; a ss h o w ni nF i g u r e1a n d2 ,
this interval corresponds to the domain of  for which the (() function is upward sloping. If
a location’s equilibrium density lies in [¯ ln[($ + )%] (28) requires that the utility to mobile
individuals be strictly less than (∗ (if a location has employment density is in [¯ ln[($+)%] then
by (27) it cannot have any mobile workers and by (25) it cannot deliver utility greater than (∗; the
stability condition (28) rules out utility equal to (∗).
IV. Mapping the Model Economy to U.S. Data
The goal of this section is to restrict the parameters of the model so that the behavior of the
model economy matches the behavior of the US economy in as many dimensions as there are
parameters. An important preliminary step in doing so is to decide what geographical areas in
the U.S. correspond to localities in the model economy. There are two key assumptions about
localities made in the model. First, the set of locations exhaust the physical space available for
economic activity and, second, people live and work in the same locality. The second assumption
suggests choosing the geographical areas so that there is little, or no, inter-area commuting. The
ﬁrst assumption suggests choosing a collection that is comprehensive enough to include most of
U.S. territory. With these requirements in mind, the geographic areas were chosen to be the 17
consolidated metropolitan statistical areas (CMSAs), 258 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs),
and 2248 rural counties. Together, this gives a total of 2523 approximately self-contained labor
market areas, covering all of the 48 contiguous states.7
Setting aside the agglomeration threshold the numerical speciﬁcation of the model described
by (23) - (27) involves setting values for the ﬁve economy-wide parameters, namely,  and
 and 3×2523 locality-speciﬁc parameters, namely, locality areas ', locality-speciﬁcf a c t o r s&
and locality-speciﬁc density of immobile individuals . Some of these parameters can be set by
appealing to direct observations and to the ﬁndings of existing microstudies. These include the
land area of each locality ', which is obtained by direct observation, and the parameters and
 Microeconomic studies (Sveikauskas (1976), Moomaw (1981), Rosenthal and Strange (2003))
indicate that  varies between 002 and 009 for diﬀerent industries, with ( =0 03 being the
median value. The calibration will take 003 as the starting point but will examine sensitivity of
7All MSA and CMSA deﬁnitions pertain to 1990.
13the results to higher and lower values. Expenditure shares of businesses and households suggest
that  =0 70 (Gollin(2002)) and  =0 50 (Jacobs and Shipp (1990)) are reasonable choices8.
There are no estimates of  so I assigned it a value of 001 on the ground that some positive eﬀect
of size on utility seems reasonable.
The congestion cost parameter  controls the response of the price of the non-transportable
good to variations in local employment density. The non-transportable good is a stand-in for goods
and services that are locally produced and consumed, of which housing services is clearly the most
important. Figure 3 plots the logarithm of 1990 median house values in metropolitan areas against
metropolitan employment density. The plot shows a positive relationship and yields a regression
coeﬃcient of 93 × 10−4 Roback (1982) estimated a relationship between the logarithm of the site
price of residential land and population density, controlling for several city-speciﬁcf a c t o r s . H e r
estimate implies a  value of 36 × 10−49 The baseline calibration will take 100 × 10−4 as the
starting point for the value of  but sensitivity of results to values of  between 60 × 10−4 and
140 × 10−4 will be considered. These parameter choices and ranges are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1






' ln(1990 area of CMSA/MSA )
I now describe how the remaining parameters, namely, & and  are restricted. Additional
restrictions come from requiring that, for any given values of the parameters in Table 1 and for any
given choice of  the model reproduce the actual 1999 employment densities for each locality as
a stable equilibrium outcome.
Denote the observed employment density in each locality in 1999 by obs
 and suppose, without
any loss of generality, that the utility received by mobile individuals, (∗ is ln(100) Observe that
8See Chatterjee and Carlino (2001) for a more extensive discussion of the evidence on  and 
9The coeﬃcient on the density variable in her regression is 20 × 10
−4 (Table 3, p. 1272). Since the median
employment to population ratio for metropolitan areas in my data set is 057, Roback’s estimate of the density
coeﬃcient implies a  value of 36 × 10
−4
14for any choice of values for parameters listed in Table 1, and for any choice of the implied values
of ($+)% and  divide the set of localities into two mutually exclusive groups. In one group are
localities for which ¯   ln[($ + )%] and obs
 ∈ [¯ ln[($ + )%]] For localities in this group, it
follows from (27) that
 = obs
  (29)
That is, all localities in this group are in a corner equilibrium. Furthermore, (28) implies an upper
bound on the strength of locality-speciﬁc factors, namely
&  ln(100) − ($ + )' − ($ + ) · obs
 − % · obs
  (30)




& ≤ ln(100) − ($ + )' − ($ + ) · obs
 − % · obs
  (32)
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This last restriction asserts that if there is at least one mobile individual in locality , & must
attain its upper bound and, conversely, if & does not attain its upper bound, there must not be
any mobile individuals in locality  The conditions (29)-(33) exhaust the restrictions on {& }
=1
implied by the requirement that {obs
 }
=1 be consistent with a stable equilibrium.
The next set of restrictions come from assuming that  in (31) is equal to ln(min − 1) − '
where min is the lowest level of local employment observed for 1999. This assumption ensures that
regardless of which localities end up in the second group, each has at least one mobile individual
and, hence, each location’s & attains the upper bound in (32). The assumption, therefore, pins
down both the  and the & for all localities in the second group. Since min is a small number (120
to be exact), the vast majority of workers in localities falling into the second group get classiﬁed
as mobile. In the approach being followed in this paper, the hypothetical relocation of workers is
the way in which the inﬂuence of agglomeration economies is revealed and hence it’s reasonable to
minimize restrictions on mobility to the extent possible.10
10One could, for instance, set  = 
obs
 for localities in the second group as well but then, regardless of the values
of  there will be no change in the distribution of employment when agglomeration economies are suppressed.
15The remaining set of parameters to be pinned down are the & for the ﬁrst group. As noted
earlier, the model and the data do not restrict the level of & for these localities other than to say
that each must be strictly less than the upper bounds implied by the stability of local equilibria. To
make the & “observable”, I assume that the distribution of & for the localities that are in a corner
equilibrium (ﬁrst group) is no diﬀerent from the distribution of & for localities that are in interior
equilibrium (second group). I then use the distribution of & for localities in the second group to
assign to each  in the ﬁrst group the average value of & conditional on & not exceeding its upper
b o u n di n( 3 0 ) . 11
V. Computational Experiments
In order to assess the contribution of agglomeration economies to the spatial concentration of
employment, I need a way to describe and summarize the degree of spatial concentration in em-
ployment. An attractive way to do this is by using Lorenz curves. In the present context, a Lorenz
curve is constructed by ﬁrst ordering the localities by their employment density, with the most
dense locality being ranked ﬁrst. Then, the cumulative percentage of land areas (running from 0
to 100) of localities so ordered is plotted against the cumulative percentage of employment. If em-
ployment were uniformly distributed over the U.S. continental landmass, this plot would coincide
with the 45-degree line. But if employment is not uniformly distributed, the curve will be bowed
above the 45-degree line. As Figure 4 shows, the curve is indeed heavily bowed. The top 1 percent
of the densest U.S. territory accounts for about 15 percent of total employment, the top 2 percent
accounts for about 25 percent, and the top 15 percent accounts for 50 percent. The Gini coeﬃcient
associated with this Lorenz curve is 078 This summary measure of spatial concentration is used
in this study.12
A. Restoring the Stability of Low-Density Localities via Restrictions on Mobility
In the ﬁrst set of experiments the agglomeration threshold  =1  For each set of experiments, the
starting calibration sets values of the economy-wide parameters to those noted in Table 1 and, in the
11Instead of assigning the conditional expectation, one could a assign a random  conditional on  not exceeding
the relevant upper bound. One could then do this random assignment for each  (in the ﬁrst group) many times over
and calculate an equilibrium for each set of assignment. For the baseline calibration, this procedure led, on average,
to almost the same results as reported in the text.
12See Carlino and Chatterjee (2002) for a discussion of Lorenz curves based on employment density.
16case of parameters for which a range is speciﬁed ( and %), to the values noted in boldface. Thus,
the starting calibration implies ($ + )% is 106 workers per square miles (rounded). Since  =1 
and all localities have positive employment, any location with density less than or equal to 106
falls in the ﬁrst group of localities, i.e., the group of localities that are in a corner equilibrium with
 = obs
 . In this instance, this group contains 2321 localities and about 25 percent of employment.
The remaining 202 localities fall into the second group and are (by the ﬁnal assumption made in
the previous section) at an interior equilibrium; the & and  for the second group are determined
as described earlier. The distribution of the &’s observed for this second group is used to pin down
the &’s for the ﬁrst group in the manner described at the end of the previous section.
For the counterfactual, a new equilibrium is calculated with the agglomeration parameters 
and  set to zero and all other parameters unchanged. In the absence of agglomeration economies,
the (() function is downward sloping for every locality and, consequently, there is no possibility
of multiple equilibria. In this new equilibrium, diﬀerences in employment density across localities
stem entirely from diﬀerences in fundamentals, i.e., diﬀerences in the &'  and 
Figure 5 plots the actual Lorenz curve for 1999 along with the Lorenz curve corresponding to the
new equilibrium. The new (counterfactual) Lorenz curve lies inside the actual one, indicating that in
the model agglomeration economies contribute unambiguously to the concentration of employment.
The Gini index for the new Lorenz curve is 059 about 24 percent less than the actual Gini index
of 078. Although a decline in the spatial concentration of 24 percent is a sizeable eﬀect, the more
remarkable feature of Figure 5 is the extent of spatial concentration remaining in the model after
agglomeration economies are suppressed. For this experiment at least, agglomeration economies fail
to emerge as the major contributor to spatial concentration. The bulk of the spatial concentration
appears to be due to the spatial inequality in the fundamentals.
The proximate cause of this result is apparent from Figure 6. The ﬁgure displays both the
actual employment density across localities in 1999 (with locations ranked according to declining
employment densities) and each locality’s counterfactual employment density. The horizontal line
drawn at ln(106) divides the set of localities into the two groups: localities with density less than
or equal to 106 are in the ﬁrst group, (i.e., the group that is initially at corner equilibrium) and
localities with density greater than 106 are in the second group (i.e., the group that is initially at
interior equilibrium). Among the second group, elimination of agglomeration economies generally
leads to a drastic decline in size (and density); with a handful of exceptions, localities in this
17group essentially disappear as they drop down to the lowest employment level permitted in the
counterfactual (120 workers). Among the ﬁrst group, elimination of agglomeration economies leads
generally to a substantial increase in employment density, with low density locations tending to
gain the most. Thus, the currently dense locations become very sparse and the currently sparse
locations become very dense. It’s this switch which prevents the Gini index from falling steeply.
The reason the index falls at all is that the new dense locations are much smaller in land area than
the currently dense locations; relative to the actual Lorenz curve, a bigger percentage of land area
is needed to account for any given share of total employment.
This pattern of employment relocation can be understood by looking at the diﬀerence in (log)
utility of a mobile individual in a currently high density location and a currently low-density
location. From the (() function, this diﬀerence is
(() − (()=( & − &) − ($ + ) · ( − ) − ($ + ) · (' − ')+% · ( − )
where , and  are any two currently high and low density locations, respectively. The calibration
of the model assigns a non-positive value to this diﬀerence. But when agglomeration economies are
eliminated, this diﬀerences reduces to
(() − (()=( & − &)+% · ( − )
Since    the second term contributes positively to the diﬀerence, i.e., low density localities look
more attractive because of low congestion costs. What is interesting is that the ﬁrst term generally
contributes positively as well. Figure 6 plots the logarithm of location speciﬁcf a c t o r si m p u t e dt o
each locality, with localities ranked according to declining employment density. There is a clear
upward tilt to the plot, with currently low-density localities being assigned superior TFP and/or
amenity terms.13 It’s this combination of low congestion costs and generally superior fundamentals
that leads to a re-emergence of employment concentration in currently sparse localities.
T h em e t h o do fa s s i g n i n g& to localities in the ﬁrst group will tend to assign higher values to
lower density localities. To see this, observe that for low-density localities the (() function is
locally increasing. Therefore, a locality that has the same land area but lower density relative
to another locality will have a higher upper bound for & Consequently, the average & conditional
on & not exceeding the upper bound will also be higher. That’s one reason for the upward tilt
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in the production of the transportable and local good, respectively, and  is locality speciﬁca m e n i t yt e r m .
18in Figure 6. But the relatively low values assigned to the & in localities in the second group
(i.e., the currently dense locations) reﬂects the fact that these localities beneﬁt a great deal from
agglomeration economies. If these locations also had generally superior TFP and/or amenity factors
(relative to low density localities), the general equilibrium of the model would imply a higher level of
density for these localities than is actually observed. An implication of this is that the assignment
of & for this group of localities depends importantly on the magnitude of the (net) beneﬁts of
agglomeration. This is the point to which I turn next.
Table 2
Impact of Net Agglomeration Beneﬁts on Spatial Concentration,  =1
Parameters: % Decline Mean & of 20 Most Dense Localities ÷ % Workers who # of Corner
× 104 in Gini Mean & of 20 Least Dense Localities are Immobile Localities
001, 14 35 104 12 1920
002, 12 31 101 18 2184
00310 24 097 25 2321
004, 81 7 0 93 35 2426
005, 61 0 0 88 55 2478
F o ra n yg i v e nd e n s i t yl e v e l ,t h e( n e t )b e n e ﬁt from agglomeration increases with $ +  and
decreases with % Therefore, for the parameter ranges noted in Table 1, the net beneﬁtf r o ma g -
glomeration is lowest when  =0 01 and  =1 4 ×10−4 and highest when  =0 05 and  =6 ×10−4
Table 2 shows that as the net beneﬁt from agglomeration rises, the contribution of agglomeration
economies to spatial concentration (as measured by the decline in the Gini index) falls from 32
percent to 9 percent. The third column, which measures the ratio of the average & assigned to
the 20 most dense localities to the average & assigned to the 20 least dense localities, indicates
t h em a i nr e a s o nw h yt h i sh a p p e n s . W h e nt h en e tb e n e ﬁts from agglomeration is low, the model
replicates the observed concentration of employment by making the currently dense locations more
attractive in term of fundamentals than the currently sparse localities. Conversely, when the net
beneﬁt of agglomeration is high, currently dense locations are assigned less favorable fundamentals
than currently sparse localities. Consequently, eliminating agglomeration economies results in the
re-emergence of concentration in the currently sparse localities when agglomeration beneﬁts are
high.
19The ﬁnal two columns in Table 2 report the fraction of workers who are assigned to be immobile
and the number of localities in a corner equilibrium. The total number of workers classiﬁed as
immobile is the sum of workers in all localities in a corner equilibrium plus min times the number
of localities in an interior equilibrium. The percentage of immobile workers is simply this sum as a
percentage of total employment. When net beneﬁt from agglomeration is low, this fraction is low
because the number of localities in a corner equilibrium is low. As net beneﬁt from agglomeration
rises, the number of localities in corner equilibrium rises and percentage of immobile workers rises.
For the last row, over 50 percent of the workers are immobile. Because there is a tendency for
employment to reconcentrate in currently low-density localities, these restrictions contribute to the
decline in the Gini index. If these restrictions were to be removed, the Gini index would decline
less (or might not not decline at all).
B. Restoring Stability of Low-Density Localities via an Agglomeration Threshold and
Limited Restriction on Mobility
As noted earlier, empirical speciﬁcations of agglomeration economies do not consider threshold
eﬀects explicitly. However, it’s worth exploring the implications of an agglomeration threshold for
two reasons. First, empirical studies on agglomeration eﬀects examine urban areas only and there
is, therefore, an implicit assumption that agglomeration economies are not relevant for the large
number of rural areas present in this study. By choosing  appropriately, agglomeration economies
can be eliminated for rural areas. Second, an agglomeration threshold means that many low-density
localities can be in a stable interior equilibrium because the (() function is now locally decreasing
(recall Figure 2). For these low-density localities, the calibration pins down the location-speciﬁc
parameters and, hence, reduces the uncertainty about fundamentals.
Several values of the agglomeration threshold are examined in this section. The value of 
If o c u so ni s =3 5 000 This value is only slightly smaller than the smallest employment level
among metropolitan localities. Thus, with this value, rural counties do not experience any beneﬁts
of agglomeration while all urban localities do. Figure 8 displays the actual and counterfactual
Lorenz curves with all all other parameters held at their starting values (i.e., at the values for
which Figure 5 was drawn). The counterfactual Lorenz curve is now noticeably closer to the 45
degree line. The Gini index declines from 078 to 029,ad e c l i n eo fa b o u t63 percent. Figure 9
shows the actual and counterfactual employment densities. Once again, there are some currently
20high density localities that become very sparse but now there are no currently sparse localities that
become very dense. Figure 10 plots the imputed &. There is clear endency for the imputed & to
decline with density, and the mean & of the 20 most dense localities is now somewhat higher than
the mean & o ft h e2 0l e a s td e n s el o c a l i t i e s .
The contrast between Figures 5 and 8 shows that the presence of a threshold for agglomeration
economies can signiﬁcantly raise the contribution of local increasing returns to spatial concentration.
Since a threshold limits the scope of agglomeration economies, this result seems counter-intuitive.
The key is to understand how an agglomeration threshold changes the imputation of & for low-
density localities. A low-density locality is always attractive because it has low congestion costs.
For a low-density locality to remain low density in a stable equilibrium, this attraction must be
balanced by some disadvantage. In the absence of an agglomeration threshold, a low-density lo-
cality can be at a disadvantage simply because it’s small and has low agglomeration beneﬁts; in
particular, it could have good fundamentals and still be low density. When there is an agglomer-
ation threshold, the scope of agglomeration economies is constrained and a low employment level
implies less of a productivity disadvantage for low-density localities. Consequently, to account for
a low-density locality as a stable equilibrium, the disadvantage of small size now has to be supple-
mented with disadvantage of poor fundamentals. This is the reason why Figures 7 and 10 look so
diﬀerent. This diﬀerence implies that when agglomeration economies are suppressed, employment
rises substantially in most low-density localities. The failure of concentration to re-emerge in a few
currently sparse locations is the reason the Gini index declines more steeply.
There is another eﬀect that also works toward generating a larger contribution of local increasing
returns to spatial concentration. With an agglomeration threshold in place, the number of localities
that are in a corner equilibrium drops from around 2321 to only 230 Consequently, the percentage
of individuals who are immobile drops from 25 to 12 percent. Since more individuals are free
to relocate, the pattern of &’s has a larger inﬂuence on the distribution of individuals in the
counterfactual and, as already discussed, this pattern is conducive to a dispersed distribution of
employment rather than a concentrated one.
21Table 3
Impact of Net Agglomeration Beneﬁts on Spatial Concentration,  =3 5 000
Parameters: % Decline Mean & of 20 Most Dense Localities÷ %W o r k e rW h o #o fC o r n e r
 × 104 in Gini Mean & of 20 Least Dense Localities Are Immobile Localities
001, 14 35 107 2 47
002, 12 54 105 6 124
00310 63 102 12 230
004, 86 4 0 99 22 329
005, 65 3 0 96 42 380
Table 3 shows how increases in the net beneﬁt of agglomeration alter the contribution of ag-
glomeration economies. It’s helpful to compare Table 3 and Table 2, row by row. For each row, the
percentage decline in the Gini index is higher in Table 3 than in Table 2, the ratio of the mean & of
the 20 most dense localities to the mean & of 20 least dense localities is higher in Table 3 than in
Table 2, and the percentage of workers who are immobile is lower in Table 3 than in Table 2. These
results are in line with the fact that an agglomeration threshold implies a more adverse imputation
of & for currently sparse localities and less restrictions on mobility.
Reading down the columns of Table 3, one ﬁnds that the contribution of local increasing returns
to spatial concentration is generally increasing in the net beneﬁts of agglomeration. When the net
beneﬁts are low, the model imputes relatively generous & to the currently dense locations (other-
wise, these localities would not be as dense as they are). Consequently, eliminating agglomeration
economies does not lead to a big decline in the Gini index because the currently dense locations
retain a fairly large fraction of workers. As the net beneﬁt rises, the model imputes less favorable
& to the currently dense localities and, consequently, leads to a more dispersed employment distri-
bution in the counterfactual. This pattern is borne out until we reach the last row, at which point
there is a fall in the contribution of agglomeration economies. This fall is due to the fact that for
this parametrization more than 40 percent of workers are immobile.
22Table 4
Impact of Threshold Size on Spatial Concentration,  =0 03=1 0× 10−4
Parameter % Decline Mean & of 20 Most Dense Localities÷ %W o r k e r sW h o #o fC o r n e r
 in Gini Mean & of 20 Least Dense Localities Are Immobile Localities
12 4 0 96 25 2321
20000 63 101 17 513
35000 63 102 12 230
50000 62 103 10 143
100000 56 103 6 47
200000 44 104 3 15
300000 36 105 2 6
Table 4 displays how the contribution of agglomeration economies changes with the agglomer-
ation threshold holding  and  ﬁxed at 003 and 10 × 10−4 respectively. Clearly there is nothing
too special about the  =3 5 000; somewhat larger or somewhat smaller values also lead to a
similar contribution of agglomeration economies. However, substantially higher values of  lead
to smaller contributions. For  = 100000 200000 and 300000, the Gini index declines 56 44
and 36 percent, respectively. The reason the contribution of agglomeration economies fall oﬀ with
substantially higher values of the agglomeration threshold is because the scope of agglomeration
economies gets increasingly limited. There is simply less increasing returns with higher threshold
values and therefore less contribution of increasing returns to spatial concentration.
As noted earlier, an agglomeration threshold can substitute for mobility restrictions in ac-
counting for the stability of low-density localities. It’s worth ﬁnding out what the contribution
of increasing returns would be if the threshold is so high that there are no localities in a corner
equilibrium. For each row in Table 5, the agglomeration threshold is set to the smallest value (to
the nearest 100) consistent with no locality being in a corner equilibrium. The contribution of
agglomeration economies is fairly modest in each case, and rises for the ﬁrst three rows. Over this
range, the agglomeration threshold does not change but the net beneﬁt from agglomeration goes up
leading to a rise in the contribution of increasing returns to spatial concentration. For the fourth
and ﬁfth row, there are substantial jumps in the agglomeration threshold. The agglomeration
threshold jumps up because with relatively high net beneﬁts from agglomeration, there are several
large cities with density less than ($+)%. Since the agglomeration threshold needs to be set above
23the maximum employment of localities with density less than ($+)% it becomes larger as we go
down the rows. Because of these jumps, which limit the scope of agglomeration economies, there
is now a decline in the contribution of agglomeration economies to spatial concentration. There is
essentially no contribution of increasing returns in the ﬁnal row because very few localities actually
beneﬁt from agglomeration economies.
Table 5
Impact of Net Agglomeration Beneﬁts with No Restrictions on Mobility
Parameters: % Decline Mean & of 20 Most Dense Localities÷  # of Corner
 × 104 in Gini Mean & of 20 Least Dense Localities Localities
001, 14 6 109 880500 0
002, 12 12 108 880500 0
00310 19 106 880500 0
004, 81 3 1 06 1879700 0
005, 60 1 05 8868700 0
It is of some interest to compare the third row of Table 5 with the third row of Table 2. For this
row,  and  are at their baseline values. When there is no agglomeration threshold, the contribution
of increasing returns to spatial concentration is 24 percent; if there is an agglomeration threshold
that’s high enough to eliminate all restrictions on labor mobility, the contribution of increasing
returns is 19 percent. Thus, in these two polar cases, the contribution of increasing returns is quite
similar. This comparison is of interest because the one study that did estimate something close to
an agglomeration threshold found it to be in the vicinity of 11 million workers.14
14Segal (1976) estimated the production function (1) directly using labor and capital stock data on 58 SMSAs for
1967. He used SMSA population rather than employment as the size variable and distinguished between large and
small MSAs. He found measurable productivity diﬀerences for SMSAs with populations above and below 2 million
and estimated that diﬀerence to be about 8 percent in favor of large SMSAs. Because Segal used broad population
categories to measure SMSA size, his estimate of an 8 percent productivity diﬀerential in favor of large SMSAs is not
an estimate of  On the other hand, his ﬁnding that productivity diﬀerences are discernible between the group of
SMSAs with populations greater than 2 million may be interpreted as evidence that  is around 11 million workers
(in my dataset, the ratio of employment to population is around 056),
24VI. Summary and Conclusions
This paper presented a novel approach to answering a scientiﬁcally deserving question in economic
geography: What is the relative contributions of natural advantage and increasing returns in the
spatial concentration of employment? The question is scientiﬁcally deserving not only because
it’s obviously central to a proper understanding of economic geography but also because it is not
easy to answer. If one observes densely populated localities, does one conclude that the density
results primarily from natural advantages or does one conclude that it results primarily from local
increasing returns?
In the past, researchers answered this question by measuring variation in natural resources
a n dt h e nd e t e r m i n i n gh o wm u c ho ft h eo b s e r v e dv a r i a t i o ni ne c o n o m i ca c t i v i t y( o rc o n c e n t r a t i o no f
economic activity) can be explained on the basis of the observed variation in natural resources. The
residual variation is taken as an upper bound on the contribution of increasing returns. As noted in
Ellison and Glaeser (1999), this approach requires taking a stand on the set of natural resources that
matter for economic geography. Otherwise, one could eliminate any role for increasing returns by
including as many dimensions of variation in natural resources as there are observations! However,
the more one restricts the set of natural resources, the looser is the upper bound on the contribution
of increasing returns. It’s fair to say that this approach is well-suited to measuring the impact of
spatial distribution of speciﬁc natural resources but less well-suited for measuring the contribution
of increasing returns to spatial concentration.
In contrast, the approach taken in this paper is to start with estimates of the magnitude
of agglomeration economies and use a general equilibrium model to determine how much of the
spatial variation in economic activity can be plausibly explained on the basis of these estimates. The
approach is analogous to “business-cycle accounting” or “growth accounting,” familiar to us from
the quantitative macroeconomics literature. As is the case for these other accounting exercises, the
results of the “spatial accounting” performed in this study depends on the details of the model used.
In this instance, the critical detail pertains to how the model rationalizes the stability of low-density
localities. If it is rationalized via an appeal to restrictions on labor mobility, the accounting implies
that the bulk of spatial concentration results from an unequal distribution of natural advantages. In
contrast, if it is rationalized via an agglomeration threshold (an employment level below which local
increasing returns do not operate), the accounting implies that the bulk of the spatial concentration
results from increasing returns.
25In terms of research priorities, a better understanding of the reasons for the persistence of
low-density localities is warranted. In particular, locating evidence, or lack thereof, of an agglom-
eration threshold would be a worthwhile research eﬀort. Although the literature on agglomeration
economies hasn’t stressed the possibility of an agglomeration threshold, threshold eﬀects have re-
ceived attention in the wider literature on economic geography. For instance, geographers who study
the spatial diﬀusion of innovations using epidemiological models have observed that an innovation
might fail to diﬀuse if the population density is below some critical threshold.
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Fig 4: Spatial Concentration of Employment, 1999





































Figure 5: Lorenz Curves With and Without Agglomeration Economies
Actual 
Counterfactual 
Actual Gini = 0.78           
Counterfactual Gini =0.59    























































































Figure 8: Lorenz Curves With and Without Agglomeration Economies, Agglomeration Threshold = 35,000
Actual 
Counterfactual 
Actual Gini = 0.78           
Counterfactual Gini = 0.29   





































































































Figure 10: Imputed Values of the Strength of Natural Advantage, Agglomeration Threshold = 35,000